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The Program on Alternative Investments of the Center onJapanese Economy and Business (CJEB) at Columbia
Business School hosted a conference in Tokyo, Japan, titled
“The Japanese Government as a Portfolio Manager: Managing
the Nation’s Wealth.” One hundred sixty-seven people attended
the conference to hear the views of seventeen distinguished
speakers on the topic of a Japanese sovereign wealth fund
(SWF). This report summarizes the presentations of the con-
ference.
Opening Remarks
Alicia Ogawa, director of the Program on Alternative Invest-
ments (senior advisor to CJEB as of January 31, 2009) and
adjunct associate professor at Columbia University’s School
of International and Public Affairs, opened the conference by
noting that although concerns over the power and behavior of
SWFs have diminished amidst the global financial crisis and
economic slowdown, it was nonetheless an important time
to discuss the political and economic issues they present.
Professor Ogawa identified several key questions: What is the
best way to engage SWFs? What role should they play in the
recapitalization of financial institutions? What incentives should
be introduced to guide their behavior? She noted that the recent
International Monetary Fund (IMF)–sponsored discussions
among SWFs have produced a list of “best practices,” termed
the Santiago Principles, which have advanced the debate by
providing a normative road map that SWFs intend to follow.
Professor Ogawa explained that the intent of the confer-
ence was to examine a variety of issues underlying the debate
on sovereign wealth funds in Japan. The current debate in Japan
as to whether or not to establish its own SWF is a diversion
from a far more basic and important topic: What are the coun-
try’s goals in managing its wealth, and who should be
accountable for the end result? Professor Ogawa said that
whether or not one chooses to classify the Government Pension
Investment Fund (GPIF) and the foreign exchange reserves
managed by the Ministry of Finance as de facto SWFs, the
introduction of new styles of investment and corporate gover-
nance in these funds are very important and controversial issues
facing Japan. While the present market volatility makes it tempt-
ing to justify traditional approaches to managing the nation’s
wealth, such traditional approaches are no substitute for active
risk management. Professor Ogawa emphasized that a broader
debate over SWFs in Japan is vital because it fosters pro-
ductive examination of other major, long-standing policy issues
beyond the management of GPIF and the foreign exchange
reserves. Among these issues is Japan’s stance on foreign SWF
investment, which will require policy makers to reexamine
the government’s ambiguous attitude toward private foreign
direct investment (FDI). Furthermore, Japan must consider why
the government rather than the private sector is tasked with
managing the nation’s wealth, and implicit in this discussion is
the important question of what can be done to create a dynamic
private fund management industry in Japan.
Opening Keynote Speech: Investment of Public Pension
Reserve: Objectives and Strategy
Takahiro Kawase, president of GPIF, began his keynote speech
by addressing the relationship between GPIF’s investment
mandate and the broader design of the pension system. He
said there is a common misconception that GPIF can set a tar-
get rate of return on investment independent of the government’s
considerations. In fact, GPIF’s target rate of return is deter-
mined largely based on the levels of pension premiums and
benefits set by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, as
well as demographic and economic forecasts.
Mr. Kawase went on to acknowledge that stresses on pub-
lic pension finances, such as caused by Japan’s rapidly aging
population, create a natural inclination for governments to seek
higher investment returns with the hope of raising revenue
without burdening the public with higher premiums or bene-
fit cuts. Many governments have begun to pursue this strategy,
which entails a portfolio shift to greater equity holdings. However,
Mr. Kawase stressed that pursuit of higher yields through
increased equity investment requires higher risk tolerance and
increases the exposure of the pension system to the finan-
cial markets. In the case of lost investment revenue during
an extended financial downturn, the government must ulti-
mately be willing to shift the financial burden back on the public.
He explained that GPIF is constrained with respect to the
amount of risk it can assume, because the Japanese public has
a low risk tolerance and the government has promised to cap
contribution rates at 18.3 percent and has also set a minimum
level of benefits at 50 percent of the present generation’s aver-
age income.
Accordingly, Mr. Kawase said GPIF follows a passive port-
folio strategy in which its asset composition is positioned for
the long term and is reviewed every five years. This is in con-
trast to a more activist tactical asset allocation strategy followed
by many pension funds, which adjusts the portfolio’s asset mix
to take advantage of short-term market trends. Compared
to private pension funds and many foreign public pension funds,
GPIF holds a high ratio of domestic bonds and seeks beta
returns. This conservative approach is a major criticism of
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GPIF’s portfolio strategy, given that it has generally been
outperformed over the past five years by pension funds with
higher equity ratios. However, Mr. Kawase defended GPIF’s
strategy by noting that—at the time of his presentation—the
most recent performance figures were from March 2008, and
given the dramatic decline of stock prices over the last several
months, GPIF has been spared the major losses that other pen-
sion funds are suffering.
Mr. Kawase next addressed the fact that GPIF’s basic port-
folio strategy has precluded alternative investments, and he
explained the considerations being given to diversifying into
alternative asset holdings. First, he noted that the true risk-
return tradeoff for alternative assets is unknown because there
is only short-term data, which does not offer a track record
of performance through cycles of various economic and finan-
cial conditions. He said that while the available data looks
impressive, it will be very interesting to reevaluate alternative
asset performance subsequent to the recent market upheaval.
Second, the risk-return tradeoff for alternative investments is
very much dependent on the manager’s skill, which he said
makes alternative assets difficult to position within a basic
portfolio strategy. Furthermore, the resources required to
select, supervise, and compensate such a manager must also
be considered. Finally, GPIF must determine what degree of
diversification into alternative investments is meaningful, and
then assess whether that is realistic given the size of GPIF rel-
ative to the alternative asset markets.
In conclusion, Mr. Kawase argued that characteristics of
typical SWF investment are not compatible with GPIF’s objec-
tive based on the current design of the public pension system.
He said that the source of many SWFs comes from the sale
of domestic natural resources and that they are managed
according to national interests, such as securing access to
energy sources or fostering global financial stability by recap-
italizing Western financial institutions. A nation’s people are
willing to accept higher risks and greater losses in cases where
investments are made to strategically promote national inter-
ests, he said. Conversely, he emphasized that most Japanese
are very conservative with their personal wealth and that they
would not tolerate the public pension fund being invested in
a risky manner. While some argue that allocating a portion of
GPIF to be invested more aggressively could be done in a man-
ner that helps foster a more dynamic fund management industry
in Japan, Mr. Kawase questioned the necessity and efficacy
of such a scheme.
Session I: Does Japan Need an SWF? 
Issues and Observations
Masaharu Sakata, director of the Private Equity Investment
Group, Pension Investment Department, Pension Fund
Association (PFA), discussed the PFA’s investment strategy
as well as some of the potential benefits of a Japanese SWF.
The PFA, which is comprised of the private pensions of early
retirees from Japanese companies, is Japan’s largest private-
sector pension fund manager and has grown significantly over
the past fifteen years, as many have left the public pension
system because of the weak Japanese economy. The PFA man-
ages over 12 trillion yen, the great majority of which is invested
in Japanese and foreign bonds and equities. Faced with an
aging population that requires higher payouts, Mr. Sakata said
the PFA is seeking higher returns and recently began invest-
ing in alternative asset classes. A team has been established
at PFA to manage private equity, hedge fund, and real estate
investments, and the PFA aims to increase investment in each
of these asset classes to 2 to 3 percent of total funds under
management. Mr. Sakata echoed Mr. Kawase’s concern over
the importance of risk management for pension funds, but
he suggested that this was possible while still increasing alter-
native asset holdings.
Mr. Sakata said that Japan should create an SWF to man-
age some of its foreign exchange reserves and other very
long-term assets. While he conceded that investment objec-
tives and strategies are dependent on the nature of the fund,
he said that an SWF could still be used to cope with the demo-
graphic challenges to Japan’s pension funds, as well as to invest
strategically to promote national interests.
Taisuke Sasanuma, representative partner of Advantage
Partners, LLP, shared his personal views based on his experi-
ence at a private equity fund and his interactions with SWF
managers. He said a Japanese SWF should be created with
10 trillion yen, derived from parts of Japan’s foreign cur-
rency reserves and GPIF assets. Based on Japan’s GDP, he
estimated 30 trillion yen would be a reasonable size for a
Japanese SWF to ultimately reach. In terms of SWF man-
agement, Mr. Sasanuma emphasized that the fund should
be operated fully independently of the Japanese government
and according to a performance-based compensation system.
Further, he suggested a globally diversified asset allocation,
with an emphasis on alternative investments, particularly
private equity, given theirattractive risk-return profiles relative to
other asset classes, as demonstrated over the past ten years.
Mr. Sasanuma argued that the next stage of development
of the Japanese economy must be based on intellectual prop-
erty rights and a strong, globalized financial services industry.
While Japan is a leader in technology and intellectual property
rights, much must be done to develop the financial services
industry and establish Tokyo as an Asian financial center. In
Mr. Sasanuma’s opinion, this requires training a new genera-
tion of fund managers and fostering institutional know-how,
to both of which a Japanese SWF could contribute significantly.
He concluded with the observation that the current financial
crisis has created many opportunities to buy cheap equities, and
Japan should establish an SWF expeditiously to take advantage.
Cheng Chih Sung, managing director and chief risk officer
of the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC),
described the company’s mission, organization, and invest-
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ment strategy, as well as the lessons to be learned from their
twenty-seven years of experience investing sovereign wealth.
The GIC was established as a private company wholly owned
by the government of Singapore, however the relationship is
that of fund manager and client. Mr. Sung explained that the
GIC is charged with managing the nation’s reserves to achieve
a target real return above global inflation within specific risk
tolerances. Three GIC subsidiaries carry out the investment
management functions—the largest, GIC Asset Management
Pte Ltd, handles public market investments, and two smaller
subsidiaries, GIC Real Estate Pte Ltd and GIC Special
Investments Pte Ltd, make private market investments. Overall
guidance and ultimate approval of asset allocation rest with
the board of directors, which is composed of government min-
isters and private sector leaders.
Mr. Sung next addressed some basic aspects of GIC’s
investment strategy. He said that GIC’s long investment hori-
zon allows them to forgo liquidity concerns and bear a higher
level of risk in order to achieve greater returns on the nation’s
wealth. Also, he explained that GIC is required to invest inter-
nationally because Singapore’s economy and capital markets
are so small. Accordingly, the fund invests in forty countries
worldwide, with approximately 40 percent allocated in North
America, 35 percent in Europe, and 25 percent in the Asia
Pacific.
Mr. Sung lastly identified some key lessons from GIC’s
experience for Japanese policy makers to consider as they
debate the creation of an SWF. Most importantly, an SWF must
be given one clear purpose: to achieve a specified long-term
return target within risk limits. In order to carry out this man-
date in an apolitical and professional manner, it is critical to
have clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the board of
directors, client, and management. Additionally, it is neces-
sary to institute risk diversification across all asset classes,
countries, sectors, currencies, etc. From a human resources
standpoint, Mr. Sung emphasized the need to recruit prom-
ising individuals, encourage them to experiment and be
innovative, and retain the managers that display the most
talent. Finally, he said very strong corporate governance is
essential and must be paired with a risk management culture.
Yo Takeuchi, chief financial officer of the Development Bank
of Japan (DBJ), first noted that technically the DBJ also qual-
ifies as an SWF because, similar to the GIC, the government
has 100 percent ownership of the DBJ, yet it operates at arm’s
length from the government according to carefully observed
fiduciary responsibilities. Mr. Takeuchi conceded, however,
that based on the DBJ’s investment strategy, it would not be
considered a full-fledged SWF because it does not yield high
enough returns. He said the other quasi-SWFs in Japan, includ-
ing the GPIF and the foreign reserves, also could potentially
benefit from more professional management, higher return tar-
gets, and better asset allocation.
Mr. Takeuchi recalled his days at the Ministry of Finance
dealing with difficult taxation issues regarding foreign SWF
and quasi-SWF investment in Japan. What he took away from
this experience was that transparency is essential for sover-
eign investments, and he said Japan must also provide adequate
transparency when managing public assets. Additionally, a key
matter for Japan to decide, he said, is whether it is politically
feasible to employ foreign managers to invest Japan’s public
assets. The potential for actual or perceived conflict of inter-
est has recently been demonstrated with Middle Eastern SWFs,
which have suffered heavy losses from investments that were
managed by foreigners. Given that Japan is a nation in debt
and does not have any natural resources, Mr. Takeuchi con-
cluded that the first question Japan must answer before it
creates a true SWF is where the money will come from.
Session II: Japan as a Recipient Country: 
Experience and Observations
Takeshi Isayama, chairman of Carlyle Japan, traced Japan’s
post–World War II history as a recipient of foreign capital. He
identified three stages of Japanese government policy and
attitude toward foreign capital that have changed according
to Japan’s economic environment. The first phase was char-
acterized by government control over the inflow of all foreign
capital, which it restricted it to only what was deemed nec-
essary. Beginning in 1950, the government passed a law limiting
the investment ratio of foreign capital to 50 percent and pro-
hibiting it entirely in some industries. Later, in 1961, the
government altered its policy slightly to allow IBM to establish
a subsidiary in Japan, thereby permitting 100 percent foreign
capital investments, under the condition that no profit was
remitted abroad.
The second phase began in 1964, when Japan became
a member of the IMF and the OECD and had to comply with
obligations to liberalize the inflow of foreign capital. From 1967
to 1973, Japan liberalized foreign direct investment in five
stages until, with exceptions, 100 percent foreign capital
investments were accepted. This precipitated a rapid increase
in investment from U.S. and European companies during the
1970s and 1980s. In Mr. Isayama’s opinion, the Japan gov-
ernment generally dealt with foreign capital fairly during this
period in which its economic challenge was to assess the advan-
tages and disadvantages of multinational companies investing
in Japan, and to help Japanese companies compete globally.
The third stage, from the 1990s to the present, has been
characterized by aggressive foreign capital investments and
the further globalization of the Japanese economy, businesses,
and capital markets. In the wake of the bubble economy, this
has been an era of systemic reform toward U.S. and, particu-
larly, European norms. Beginning in 1996, Prime Minister
Hashimoto carried out a “big bang” of reforms that significantly
deregulated the Japanese stock market, as well as other finan-
cial sectors and markets. Mr. Isayama described this as a painful
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process, but said the manifestations of these reforms have
been corporate restructuring, mergers and acquisitions,
increased competitiveness of Japanese companies, and greater
demand for foreign capital. Recent reforms such as the Company
Law, which was passed by the Diet in 2005, have continued
these positive trends, according to Mr. Isayama. With an aging
Japanese society, he stressed that foreign investments are
needed to achieve economic growth.
Mr. Isayama finished his presentation with observations
on financial capitalism in the twenty-first century. He said
the challenge at both the national and global level is to learn
from the current financial crisis and build structures that do
not permit the decoupling of the economy with financial cap-
italism. Maintaining the free flow of capital is critical, but
just as traceability is required of corporations for manufac-
tured products and services, he suggested the same must
be true for financial products.
Takehiko Nakao, senior deputy director-general of the
International Bureau, Ministry of Finance, Japan, discussed
some of the general issues countries face with respect to
accepting foreign SWF investment, and also the importance
of inward FDI to Japan’s economy. Mr. Nakao noted that assets
under the management of SWFs worldwide are between 2 and
3 trillion USD, and therefore the investment decisions of these
funds can have significant effects on financial markets. He
highlighted concerns of recipient countries specific to SWFs
that are being addressed by the G7 and OECD, including gov-
ernance, risk management, transparency, and accountability.
In turn, governments have also recognized the importance of
nondiscrimination toward SWF investment, transparency with
respect to future legislation on SWF investment, and protect-
ing national security without being protectionist. Mr. Nakao
made the point that because SWFs are essentially massive
accumulations of current account surpluses that cannot be
invested domestically, it is productive for all parties if the funds
are reinvested in industrialized countries in ways other than
government bonds.
According to Mr. Nakao, Japan must be open and nondis-
criminatory toward all inward FDI, including SWF investment.
Even though Japan is a current account surplus country, he
agreed with Mr. Isayama that Japan needs foreign capital to
foster economic growth. He said there is political consensus
that inward FDI needs to be increased, and the current tar-
get is to raise the level from 2.5 to 5.0 percent of GDP by 2010.
He went on to emphasize that, in his opinion, Japan’s reg-
ulatory regime is very open to foreign capital. While many of
the opposite view cite the case of The Children’s Investment
Fund, based in the UK, which was banned from acquiring a 20
percent stake in Electric Power Development Co. (J-Power)
according to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law, Mr.
Nakao noted that this was the only foreign deal prohibited out
of 760 applications. In support of his view, he also highlighted
recent actions by the government to ensure nondiscrimination
toward foreign capital with respect to the privatization of Narita
Airport, and he agreed with the recent JETRO report saying
that the real barriers to increasing inward FDI in Japan are lan-
guage, high taxes, labor costs, and cultural differences.
Furthermore, he said Japan requires new management tech-
niques and business models, and increased shareholder rights
to attract foreign capital.
Takatoshi Ito, professor at the Graduate School of Economics,
The University of Tokyo, began by speaking in greater depth
about the privatization of Narita Airport, on whose economic
advisory board he has served. Professor Ito explained that the
privatization of Narita Airport is important to understand
because it embodies all Japan’s problems with respect to
accepting foreign capital. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism (MLIT) initially proposed that foreign
capital investments in Narita Airport be restricted to 30 per-
cent. According to Professor Ito, this would require the same
restriction to be placed on Haneda Airport, which is already
20 percent foreign owned. MLIT offered many reasons for
restricting foreign capital that reflected concern over national
economic and security interests. However, the advisory board
decided that foreign capital restrictions were unwarranted
because the concerns raised were either ineffectively addressed
through such restrictions or better addressed through sepa-
rate laws.
Professor Ito also addressed the issue of the regulatory
treatment of foreign SWF investment, as opposed to that of
foreign private funds. The primary concern over SWF invest-
ments, which has been articulated most forcefully by the United
States and echoed by Japan, is that a country will invest for
strategic reasons rather than solely for profits. One hypothet-
ical example of this would be an SWF investing in foreign
companies with the intent to influence those companies in a
manner that gives a competitive edge to their own domestic
companies. Another such example would be a nondemocra-
tic country’s SWF investing with sinister intentions that pose
national security risks. Aside from these broader national inter-
ests of the recipient country, if an SWF invests with any such
strategic motives, it creates a conflict of interest with other
shareholders that are profit driven.
In addition to concerns about potential strategic invest-
ing, Professor Ito said there is fear that SWFs will engage in
short-term profit seeking, such as asset stripping, which, given
the size of SWFs, could be economically devastating to smaller
countries. Professor Ito noted that hedge funds already engage
in this type of activity and yet many countries only regulate
SWFs in this respect, despite the fact that SWFs have explic-
itly stated their long-term strategies. If short-term profit seeking
is a legitimate concern, there is no satisfactory argument being
proffered for why such regulations should discriminate against
SWFs, according to Professor Ito.
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John Ehara, CEO of Unison Capital, Inc., concluded the panel
discussion by offering his perception of SWF intentions and
behavior based on his experience as a manager of a fund in
Japan that SWFs invest in. He began by pointing out that,
despite all the concern about how SWFs invest in companies,
SWF investments have actually been weighted heavily toward
real estate. This type of inward investment can be beneficial
for Japan because it bolsters real estate prices in metropoli-
tan areas like Tokyo in the absence of domestic investment.
Mr. Ehara said that SWF direct investment in Japanese com-
panies has been very limited and will probably remain so, as he
anticipates SWFs will continue to invest through funds like his.
On the whole, there is little SWF interest in investing in
Japan, and the investment that does occur is done in a very
sophisticated manner based on extensive expert analysis of
the investment opportunities in Japan, according to Mr. Ehara.
He said that in his experience the focus of SWFs is always
on economic returns first, and any strategic considerations
are significantly less important. Moreover, he suggested, these
strategic considerations tend to entail not monopolistic or
national security motives, but more benign intentions such
as investing in green or manufacturing technology. In all the
cases he has known, there has never been any intention by
SWFs to strategically influence the management of companies.
Mr. Ehara finally addressed what he understands as two
key challenges for SWFs investing in Japanese companies.
First, Japanese companies are notoriously opaque with respect
to investment opportunities. Many such deals will not occur
through public auction; they require inside sources of informa-
tion. SWFs must have these sources to identify investment
opportunities and to initiate dialogue with companies to deter-
mine if the management and shareholders are open to SWF
capital. Second, as foreign investors, SWFs have the diffi-
cult challenge of assessing the corporate governance of
Japanese companies they may potentially invest in.
Session III: 
Creating a Fund Management Industry in Japan
Bill Wilder, president and CEO of Nikko Asset Management
Co., Ltd., began by summarizing what it takes to build an asset
management company in Japan, which he said is no differ-
ent from any other country. It first requires a willingness to
spend the money necessary to attract a high-quality staff, build
a brand, and survive long enough to grow roots. Second, an
asset management company must have an investment prod-
uct that performs well and is targeted toward the needs of the
local market. Mr. Wilder then addressed the issue of building
a fund management industry in Japan by commenting on what
he identified as four key components of the industry: (1) a pro-
gressive and responsive regulator; (2) active and competent
industry participants; (3) broad, effective, and reliable distri-
bution channels; and (4) a large and well-educated investor
base that understands the importance of investing and is
accepting of some risk.
On the first component, Mr. Wilder said, the Ministry of
Finance and the Financial Services Agency (FSA) have done
a very good job deregulating and policing the industry, despite
several instances in the past in which he disagreed with their
decisions or the speed of their reform. He suggested that
the discussion of regulators should be expanded to include The
Investment Trusts Association (ITA), the Investment Advisers
Association (IAA), the Japan Securities Dealers Association,
and various stock exchanges and banking associations that
asset managers have to deal with. He singled out the ITA and
the IAA, which are self-regulatory bodies, one or both of which
asset managers must join, and he urged that the process of
merging the two associations be accelerated. This will bene-
fit the industry by permitting a single entity to handle all asset
management issues with respect to regulators, the public,
other associations, and the stock exchanges.
Regarding industry participants, Mr. Wilder said that the
foreign financial services community and the U.S. Embassy
have been the greatest forces for the deregulation that has
occurred in Japan. He mentioned that there is a committed
group of professionals that will continue to provide leadership
on many of the issues that must still be addressed in orderto grow
the industry and betterserve the interests of Japanese investors.
The third point, distribution channels, is critical for the
industry’s success, and Mr. Wilder stressed that both retail and
institutional approaches are viable in Japan. For investment
trusts, he said, asset management companies in Japan can
choose direct distribution, which is expensive and competi-
tive, or use intermediaries such as brokers, banks, insurance
companies, and even the post office to distribute investment
products. A segment that has not developed in Japan is that
of independent financial advisors.
Finally, Mr. Wilder discussed the differences in the expe-
rience levels and risk attitudes of institutional investors and
retail investors in Japan. Institutional investors are very expe-
rienced and understanding of the risks, though he noted that
they must improve their asset allocation and the development
and retention of their investment staff. Retail investors are
generally risk averse, especially older investors who have
had bad experiences. Given the extraordinary amount of assets
held in cash or savings deposits in Japan, there is potential for
the present investment asset pool to grow fourfold, according
to Mr. Wilder. He encouraged the industry to work in coordina-
tion to educate retail investors on risk, diversification, and the
tax implications of investment decisions.
Junichiro Sano, CEO of Dalton Investments KK, described
some deficiencies of the Japanese fund management indus-
try, and suggested that the creation of an SWF would be an
impetus to improving the industry. Mr. Sano began by noting
the importance of understanding the history of Japan’s fund
management industry, including its cultural infrastructure,
to understand the ways it must evolve to be globally compet-
itive and capable of managing the nation’s wealth. Until the
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mid-1990s, consensus decision making and strict rules for
asset allocation ratios characterized Japan’s fund manage-
ment industry. Mr. Sano said this began changing somewhat
when foreign capital began to flow into Japan, which helped
professional fund managers, analysts, and traders become
part of the fund management industry’s infrastructure. However,
he argued that Japan remains a culture highly influenced by
Confucianism and its island geography in ways that impede
the creation of a dynamic fund management industry. Investing
requires risk taking, the desire to make money, and individual-
ism, all of which run counter to the Japanese way of thinking
and must be fostered through education, according to Mr. Sano.
In particular, Mr. Sano said corporate structure and com-
pensation policies should be changed to permit quicker decision
making and greater risk tolerance, and should demand higher
performance by rewarding it with appropriate remuneration.
These changes will help develop the professionalism of Japanese
fund managers and make the Japanese fund management
industry more competitive. He added that the Japanese must
learn foreign language skills, embrace cultural diversity, and
adopt a more global perspective. Without overcoming these
deficiencies, Japanese fund management companies will
not be able to compete in the global market.
Mr. Sano said an SWF’s primary importance is to increase
the nation’s long-term wealth. He argued that Japanese entre-
preneurs and corporate managers are too concerned with
protecting their own interests and they, along with all Japanese,
should appropriate greater value to the interests of future gen-
erations. Specifically, he suggested that an SWF be used to
invest in new and existing Japanese companies to make them
globally competitive. Lastly, Mr. Sano expressed regret that
when it comes to the value of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and
the nation’s wealth, Japanese prime ministers tend to be too
ignorant and unconcerned. He said that in order to have a suc-
cessful Japanese SWF, the private sector must take the initiative
to combine the best practices from Japan and abroad, and
become greater producers of wealth.
Mamoru Taniya, CEO of Asuka Asset Management, Ltd.,
described how fund management businesses must evolve with
the market. He said the era of mass production in investment
practices, where relatively few investment funds made huge
profits by devoting large amounts of money to research and
other corporate infrastructure, is over. Mr. Taniya explained
that in the past these funds would inevitably make large invest-
ments in similar positions. When something went wrong, the
funds could not easily get out, because, excluding their posi-
tions, there was little liquidity in the market. When they did exit
their positions, it caused prices to collapse. The end of this era
happened first for arbitrage practices, as exemplified in 1998
by the failure of Long-Term Capital Management. Mr. Taniya
said the same thing happened to small-sized stocks in 2006
in Japan, and is now happening in the global commodity mar-
ket and the U.S. mortgage market.
Whereas the mass production era created high barriers to
entry into the fund management industry, now knowledge is
more widely available, and the key to a fund management com-
pany’s success, said Mr. Taniya, hinges on its ability to offer
differentiated value by taking advantage of each individual’s
skill set and talents. This is not a phenomenon unique to Japan.
Fund managers and fund management businesses everywhere
must constantly reinvent their strategies, as market funda-
mentals are constantly in flux. He added that these cycles of
change are becoming shorter.
Mr. Taniya pointed out that Japanese fund managers have
proven themselves capable of excellence in many foreign invest-
ment institutions. The Japanese fund management industry’s
main problem, in his opinion, is that it does not have the nec-
essary corporate systems to take advantage of the talented
individuals available. However, he said, the development of the
fund management industry also depends on cultivating a larger
pool of young people eager to enter the industry. He concluded
by agreeing with his fellow panelists that Japan’s fund man-
agement industry has great potential for growth, but he said
the right decisions must be made to unlock it.
Clifford Shaw, advisor to the Program on Alternative
Investments, Center on Japanese Economy and Business,
offered his perspective on some Japanese attitudes and cul-
tural factors that affect the asset management industry. He
first addressed the Sakoku period, from 1633 to 1853, when
Japan was in near total isolation while trade and immigration
were expanding elsewhere in the world. He credited this period
of isolation with some of the prevailing cultural attitudes men-
tioned by the previous speakers, mainly Japan’s negative attitude
toward immigration and difficulty with diversity, and the
Japanese people’s lack of familiarity with foreign languages.
He also commented that the attitudes of the Japanese bureau-
cracy, and the attitudes of the Japanese public toward the
bureaucracy, may be a remnant of the Sakoku period. Mr. Shaw
then noted two further anachronistic attitudes in Japan that
run directly counter to essential elements of creating a strong
fund management industry. One is that there is still a strong
preference for manufacturing physical goods rather than shift-
ing to produce services and soft goods—a characteristic that
makes Japan unique among developed countries. The other is
the attitude that it is somewhat improper to have a desire to
make money. 
Mr. Shaw agreed with previous speakers that Japanese
tend to be risk averse, and he attributed this to a fear of fail-
ure. He ventured that the Japanese education system, which
places tremendous importance on exams, is an important con-
tributor to the fear of failure. He also noted that the Japanese
legal system is far more unforgiving toward bankruptcy when
compared to Anglo-Saxon countries. These commonplace atti-
tudes in Japan compound the universally painful feelings
associated with losing money that are inevitable in fund man-
agement. From an individual investor standpoint, Mr. Shaw
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ventured that the risk-averse attitudes of Japanese have been
shaped by the large financial losses that occurred during the
bubble period.
According to Mr. Shaw, Japanese corporate culture is par-
ticularly inconducive to efficient fund management. Japanese
salarymen are generally very loyal to their company, and they
become generalists as they rotate jobs in different depart-
ments over the years. Mr. Shaw described the example of a
Japanese trust bank where the general manager of the human
resources department was reassigned as the general manager
of the asset management department. This is very contrary to
the Western idea that fund management is a specialist occu-
pation that requires years of building expertise. Mr. Shaw further
said that this expertise has generally not been appropriately
compensated in Japan, but this started to change when for-
eign firms began poaching the best Japanese fund managers.
He finished his presentation with the encouraging observation
that there is an increasing emphasis in Japanese companies
on specialist training and recruitment of individuals well suited
for fund management.
Closing Keynote Speech: 
The Multilateral Policy Response to SWFs
Robert Kaproth, U.S. financial attaché and representative of
the U.S. Department of the Treasury in Japan, began by prais-
ing the multilateral efforts of SWFs and recipient countries
of SWF investments to address the many legitimate policy
issues on both sides and foster a more open and transparent
global financial system. Building off a trilateral agreement in
March 2008 between the United States, Singapore, and Abu
Dhabi, the IMF has facilitated an international working group
(IWG) of twenty-six SWFs to discuss investment principles,
and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) has developed principles for inward invest-
ment regimes.
Mr. Kaproth described the IWG discussions, which pro-
duced a set of “generally accepted principles and practices”
for SWFs, also known as the Santiago Principles. In his view,
this represents an important first step by SWFs in allying the
growing fear among many policy makers in recipient countries
about the size, objectives, and transparency of SWFs. He
explained that the Santiago Principles consist of twenty-
four principles, divided into three chapters. The first chapter
addresses the legal framework, objectives, and coordination
with macroeconomic policies of SWFs, which has helped
alleviate concerns that SWFs—particularly noncommodity
SWFs—will perpetuate contentious macroeconomic and finan-
cial policies. The second chapter articulates best practices
with respect to institutional and governance structure in order
to ensure recipient countries of the SWFs’ operational inde-
pendence. It also mitigates recipient countries’ fear of sinister
political influence in investment decisions by SWFs. The third
chapter outlines standards for SWF investment frameworks
and risk management—including disclosure of asset alloca-
tion, benchmarks, and historical rates of return—with the aim
to promote responsible investment and accountability. Mr.
Kaproth noted that the credibility of the Santiago Principles is
enhanced by the fact that the IWG encouraged input from recip-
ient countries throughout the process.
Next, Mr. Kaproth described the complementary work con-
ducted by the OECD to develop broadly accepted principles
that foster open investment policies in countries that receive
SWF investments. He said this timely initiative was intended
to preempt any protectionist outcomes from the ongoing intense
policy debates over SWFs in many recipient countries. The first
key principle of the OECD investment code holds that coun-
tries should not discriminate between domestic and foreign
investors, which Mr. Kaproth noted is the foundational open
investment principle. Further, he emphasized that this fun-
damental principle can be applied in a manner that allows
governments to address legitimate national security concerns.
The second and related principle is regulatory proportionality,
which dictates that any measures taken to address national
security should be designed specific to the transaction in ques-
tion, rather than applied as a broader regulatory policy, such
as sectoral restrictions that inevitably restrict many unprob-
lematic investments. The third principle mentioned by Mr.
Kaproth is transparency. This principle compels governments
to be forthright in explaining the investment review process
and its objectives, and to be fair and predictable in its imple-
mentation of policies. The final principle is accountability, which
Mr. Kaproth explained means that governments should employ
adequate oversight of the official implementing the investment
review process to prevent political interference.
After addressing these recent multilateral policy mile-
stones, Mr. Kaproth discussed the potential creation of a
Japanese SWF. He was clear that the United States does
not take a position on the matter because it is a sovereign deci-
sion for the Japanese government. Therefore, he offered general
observations that would apply to a Japanese SWF as well as
all other SWFs. First, the United States expects all SWFs to
adhere to the Santiago Principles. Second, he said a nation’s
public must be educated in the risk return tradeoff inherent
in SWF investments. This is important to maintain the medium-
term viability of an SWF in case there are losses. Lastly, he
discussed the significant differences in asset liability struc-
tures of commodity and noncommodity SWFs. He explained
that commodity funds are usually derived from foreign cur-
rency, which does not require sterilization by the central bank
and therefore does not have any liability. Conversely, noncom-
modity funds’ assets are often sterilized and have liability
because they are derived from exchange rate intervention.
Accordingly, noncommodity SWFs must factor the yield paid
on the sterilization debt when calculating the net return. Mr.
Kaproth acknowledged that this is something being given care-
ful consideration in the current debate over a Japanese SWF.
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